![]() (7) Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted naval commanders to seek out and defeat enemy battle fleets, thereby winning command of the sea. (6) The JOAC seems to mark a transition from “Mahanian” to “Corbettian” assumptions about warfare in regions like the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. sea and air forces found themselves driven from the Western Pacific and had to battle their way back. It may be no coincidence that the JOAC was released the day after the seventieth anniversary of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor-the last time U.S. “Superiority in any domain,” it observes, “may not be widespread or permanent it more often will be local and temporary.” Only the complete integration of land, air, and sea power can help commanders exploit “fleeting local opportunities for disrupting the enemy system.” If the United States holds command at the outset of a conflict, it may lose command eventually and have to restore it by force of arms. expeditionary forces will have to impose local, temporary superiority at critical places on the map at critical times. (5) More likely, say the JOAC’s drafters, the U.S. Equally important is that this document tries to dispel any lingering illusions about untrammeled U.S. (4) The JOAC’s central idea is that “cross-domain synergy” across military services will be critical to piercing the “anti-access” and “area-denial” measures of regional antagonists. The JOAC acknowledges the old yet still-relevant reality that external powers may encounter resistance from strong local powers that boast sizable advantages when fighting in their own backyards. commanders can no longer assume that they can gain access to forward bases in places like Japan or Bahrain, let alone project power onto foreign shores with impunity. (3) In recent years, however, regional powers like China and Iran have bought or built weaponry that equips them to challenge U.S. If the United States no longer had to fight for control of the commons, it was logical for American leaders to refocus their energies on “power projection” in embattled regions. armed forces grew accustomed to “commanding” the global “commons,” the seas and skies beyond the jurisdiction of any government. ![]() (2) The Soviet Union was dissolved twenty years ago. (1) The announcement of the JOAC seems to signify a healthy shift in the attitude toward the contested regions of the globe. This analysis attempts to introduce Corbett’s strategic theory and compare it to Mahan’s. (In practice, their theories should not be classified in such a dualistic manner.) However, Corbett is undeniably little known in Japan. When the issue of seapower is debated in Europe and the United States, the general tendency is to focus on the strategic theories of Mahan, who advocated sea power, and of Corbett, who stressed on maritime strategy. He offered incisive suggestions for modern military operations by advocating a “maritime strategy” based on a sophisticated joint operation. Corbett’s theory was different from that of Mahan, who was suspected to have advocated “navalism” and an “ocean supremacy theory.” Corbett stressed on land space as being the most important for human life. In this regard, the article mentioned that the superiority of the United States in military strategy was threatened in the current international security environment it introduced the different ways in which Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840−1914) and Corbett perceived command of the sea, along with the significance of the JOAC. The superordinate concept of “Air Sea Battle,” the Joint Operational Access Concept (hereafter JOAC), was announced last December. Analysis of this monthly report has covered this article and examined the maritime strategy of Sir Julian Corbett (1854−1922), a British historian and strategic thinker. Holmes, an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. On December 11, 2011, an online international current-affairs magazine, The Diplomat, carried an article titled “From Mahan to Corbett?” by James R.
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